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Abstract
Social cognition is a fundamental aspect of human experience that enables us to have
relationships with and understanding of other people. Social relationships have been shown to
mitigate cognitive decline in old age and benefit cognitive functioning, and the social interaction
on which these relationships rely requires an extensive network of cognitive processes, and by
extension neural systems, that have not, as of yet, been widely studied in older adults. Nor has
the function of these systems been tied to social relationships in the real world. Here, I will
compare self-reports of real-world quality and extent of social networks with behavioral and
neural measures of other-regard in the laboratory. It is hoped that by so doing we will be able to
link social neuroscientific measures in the laboratory with persons’ perceptions of the quality and
extent of their social relationships. In this study, other-regard in older adults was operationalized
with a reaction-time measure in an implicit turn-taking task, neural measures were provided by
dense array EEG, and all participants also completed self-report measures of empathy subscales
and of the quality and extent of their social networks. I found that measures of empathic
personal distress decreased with increased other-regard (r = -0.36, p = 0.01, R2 = -6.464, beta =
0.47), while increased quality and extent of social networks associated marginally with increased
other-regard (r = 0.20, p = 0.11, R2 = -6.216, beta = 0.39). Neural analyses are ongoing and are
expected to show differential activation consistent with cognitive processes such as theory of
mind, empathy, joint attention, and executive control.
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Introduction
Social cognition is the process of understanding others by representing and experiencing
other’s mental states, which is critical for social development and cognitive functioning
(Lieberman, 2007; Gow, Pattie, Whiteman, Whalley, & Deary, 2007). While much of our
understanding on the topic has been based on research in young adults and children, there has
been little investigation into the psychological and neural underpinings of social cognition in
older adults. Evidence suggests that increased social involvement in older adults facilitates
healthy aging and well-being into old age. With nearly 1 in 4 Americans classified as a senior
citizen in the year 2010, it is imperative to ascertain which cognitive and neural processes might
contribute to increased social relationship quality and extent in older adults (U.S. Census, 2010).
Conceivably, older adults may differ in subtle ways from younger adults in the ways in which
their neural systems facilitate social relationships. As social interaction involves many different
cognitive processes, such as theory of mind, empathy, joint attention, and executive control, it
stands to reason that having a greater social network would increasingly recruit and shape these
processes and their neural systems. By having more social interactions, therefore, older adults
could potentially prevent cognitive decline due to aging as well as certain age-specific disorders
such as dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. This study investigates whether social cognition and
other-regard measured in the laboratory correlate with self-report indices of social cognition such
as empathic concern and real-live social network extent. This study also looks at which neural
networks are involved in other-regard in older adults and whether these correspond at all to
individual differences in self-reported social network quality and extent.
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Social Networks and Cognition in Older Adults
As people live increasingly longer lives due to improving medicine and health practices,
researchers are interested in the wellbeing of older adults and what factors influence people’s
cognitive, emotional and social outcomes. Successful aging has been shown to be positively
influenced by one’s social network and social support, as friends, family and marital ties can
increase one’s psychological well-being (Gow et al., 2007). According to the World Health
Organization, prevention of social isolation is necessary for good health since loneliness, social
isolation and stressful social ties can contribute to higher disability, poorer recovery from illness
and even early death (World Health Organization, 2002). Supportive social ties, on the other
hand, have been shown to enhance physical and mental health among older adults, as social
support can act as a buffer against stressful life events and provide mental stimulation necessary
for dealing with other people (Cohen & Willis, 1985; Zunzunegui, Alvarado, Del Ser & Otero,
2003). In a review of social support and physiological processes, Uchino et al. (1996) states that
social support has beneficial effects such that the net effect may be to biologically age the
individual at a slower rate. This has important implications for the wellbeing and quality of life
in older adults. Not only does social support provide emotional, cognitive and physical stability,
but it satisfies the fundamental human need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This would
lead to greater life satisfaction and desire to interact with more people, thus propagating the
cognitive and social benefits. Similarly, the National Institutes of Health Cognitive and
Emotional Health Project has stated that emotional support and social networks are potential
protective factors against cognitive decline (Hendrie, Albert, Butters, Gao, Knopman, Launer et
al., 2006). Cognitive decline is thus not an inevitable consequence of growing older, but can be
mitigated by positive social networks. This is consistent with the “Use it or lose it” hypothesis, in
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which the mental stimulation needed to interact with others delays cognitive impairments and
protects the brain against pathological processes by creating better cognitive strategies and
potentially increasing neural growth and synaptic density (Zunzunegui et al., 2003). Social
network quality and extent thus positively influences mental health in old age. There is also a
considerable body of evidence which show that an intellectually stimulating lifestyle predicts
better maintenance of cognitive functioning in old age and is associated with a decreased risk of
developing Alzheimer’s disease, dementia and other age-related neurological disorders (Hertzog,
Kramer, Wilson, & Lindenberger, 2009). Since social interaction necessitates many different
cognitive abilities and is mentally stimulating, it is probable that having more social interaction
would lead to better cognitive outcomes later in life. Therefore, social cognition can contribute to
improved quality of life, decreased risk of neurological disorders and successful aging.
Effects of Aging on Neural Processing and Cognition
With these effects of social cognition in mind, it is important to assess what causes
cognitive decline in older adults, how they can be mitigated and what other neural changes occur
in old age. Aging is known to associate with decreased neurocognitive functioning due to
microanatomical changes in the brain such as decreased synaptic density, neuronal density and
neuronal size, as well as decreases in gray matter in the prefrontal cortex (Aine, 2011).
Furthermore, it has been suggested that cognitive processes supported by the prefrontal lobe are
among the first to decline with increasing age (Tisserand & Jolles, 2003). Therefore, it is
reasonable to suggest that people with better social networks and social support would have
better cognitive processing and subsequent well-being than those who are socially isolated,
because they would utilize cognitive functioning which is served by the prefrontal cortex, such
as ToM, joint attention and attention switching, in their social interactions on a regular basis.
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Interestingly, it has also been shown that older adults have different neural patterns for certain
cognitions than younger adults, such as memory, even if these cognitive functions have not
declined over the years. A study by Cabeza et al. (2002) showed that older adults had more
bilateral prefrontal activation for memory retrieval whereas young adults showed only right
prefrontal activation. These findings are consistent with the frontal deficit hypothesis mentioned
above and suggest that the older adults were compensating for their decreased gray matter in the
prefrontal cortex by recruiting additional brain regions in order to maintain the same level of
cognitive ability as in earlier life. This research further shows that in normal aging adults there
are changes in brain structure and connectivity that can affect neurocognitive processes even if
there is no decline in cognitive functioning. In this way, it is important to investigate the neural
networks of social cognition in older adults to see whether any changes in brain structure due to
aging have affected their neurocognitive social processing and whether there are more efficient
neural networks in people who have more social interaction.
Cognitive Aspects of Social Functioning
In order to better understand the positive effects of social interaction, one must first
understand the cognitive processes that underlie social cognition. To effectively interact with
others and understand their behavior, one must have insight into what others believe, think and
feel, and understand how these mental states relate to their behavior (Lieberman, 2007). This
requires understanding oneself in relation to others, perspective taking, and understanding others
as similar but distinct from oneself. While there are many cognitive processes involved in
understanding others’ mental states, the three major processes discussed here are theory of mind
(ToM), empathy and joint attention. ToM relates to the ability to represent another’s
psychological state by understanding that other people have minds with thoughts and feelings
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similar to oneself. Empathy and joint attention, meanwhile, relate to experiencing another’s
mental state through shared perceptual ground (joint attention) and shared emotional responses
(empathy). These shared mental states give rise to an understanding of what the other person is
going through and increased social liking and bonding (Decety & Lamm, 2006). Interestingly,
there have been few studies which show the correlation between these social cognitive processes
and social network extent. It would seem self-evident that if people had smoother social
interaction due to these cognitive processes, they would also have more social contact as a result.
This study aims to rectify this lack of empirical evidence by showing the behavioral and neural
metrics of such cognitive processes and if they relate to real-world indices of social cognition
such as social network extent. For now, however, it is important to look at these cognitive
processes more in-depth, in order to further understand their significance for social cognition.
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to recognize another as similar to oneself but also
distinct. It is a cornerstone for social cognition which allows us to take the perspective of another
and understand other’s mental states such as beliefs, intentions, emotions and thoughts, in order
to predict their behavior. ToM has also been called “mind-reading” or mentalizing, as this
understanding of other’s minds is key to successful social interaction (Frith & Frith, 1999). It
typically develops in humans by the age of four and is involved in a greater awareness of the
intentions and perspectives of others (Lieberman, 2007). While ToM has traditionally been
studied in developmental psychology, it has many implications for social psychology and
neuroscience. As shown in a study by Humphreys & Bedford (2011), neurological patients with
impairments in ToM showed decreased other-regard in a “social Simon” task. This meant that
people with little or no ToM did not take into account the presence of another person during a
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social turn-taking task. Such a finding thus strengthens the relationship between ToM and social
cognition. Since ToM includes the representation of another person and their mental state, it
necessitates numerous cognitive abilities and is critical for effective social interaction. ToM has
been shown to utilize several brain regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and temporal-parietal junction (TPJ). Of these, the MPFC plays a
predominant role in the understanding of self and another’s mind (Mason & Macrae, 2008).
Likewise, it has been implicated in integrating the representations of another person and of that
person’s mental state (Wang et al., 2011). The anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) has also
been implicated in understanding social intention, along with the left TPJ (Ciaramidaro,
Adenzato, Enrici, Erkd, Pia, Bara, Walter, 2007). This is interesting because the aPCC is
connected to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which is involved in attentional switching,
executive functioning and self-regulation, processes that would also be necessary for social
functioning (Lieberman, 2007). These studies illustrate that ToM is important for social
cognition by helping us understand the motives, intentions, thoughts and beliefs of another
person through perspective taking and mental representation. Without ToM, we would be
impaired in our ability to distinguish others from the self and would have difficulties imagining
what another person might be thinking or experiencing.
Empathy and Social Cognition
One form of ToM is empathy, which relies on intuition and is a central part of social
cognition. Empathy is the social ability to accurately recognize and share the feelings of others,
without confusion between one’s own feelings and another’s. In this way, it is an experiential
ToM which encompasses a number of different cognitive functions. It is further defined within
psychological and neuroscientific circles by its three main components: an affective response to
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another person’s emotional state, perspective taking and emotion regulation (Decety & Jackson,
2006). From an evolutionary perspective, affective sharing between self and others stems from
our unconscious automatic mimicry of facial expressions and behavior. Such mimicry triggers
similar expressions on one’s own face which results in similar emotional perception and feeling,
allowing for greater understanding of what the other person is experiencing and leading to
prosocial behaviors such as altruism (Preston & de Waal, 2002). From a social psychological
perspective this unconscious mimicry leads to smoother social interactions and increased liking,
which serves to foster relationships with others. Therefore, people with higher levels of
dispositional empathy tend to show this “chameleon” effect to a greater extent, and would
propagate this trait since they would have a greater social network who could then help them in
their times of need (Decety & Lamm, 2006). This automatic processing of other people’s
emotional states leads to simulation of their mental state, which can create an empathic response
towards the other person given the right circumstances. Cognitive processes such as contextual
appraisal, beliefs about the other person and motivation can block empathic responses, for
instance if one feels that the other person deserves to be in pain, even if the person is able to
simulate the other’s mental state. In this way, simply imitating others and representing their
psychological state is not enough to always evoke empathy. Despite this, however, mimicry and
simulation are necessary building blocks for understanding what other people are experiencing
and, given the right context and motivation, to share their emotions (Vignemont & Singer, 2006).
The ability to experience another’s emotions via empathy has also been explored with
cognitive neuroscience. In neuroimaging studies, it has been shown that when people view others
in physical or emotional pain, they also feel a similar sense of pain through neural systems that
produce such states in themselves (Jackson et al., 2005). These shared neural circuits suggest that
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people are able to simulate neurally what another person is feeling and that similar networks are
used to represent one’s own and others’ affective pain. However, the neural network involved in
pain processing is activated more extensively and includes other brain regions when imagining
oneself in pain, which is consistent with the pattern of activity detected in the first-hand
experience of pain. In this way, people who empathize with others simulate and feel another’s
pain but not to the same extent as if they were in physical or emotional pain themselves (Decety
& Lamm, 2006). This experience of another’s affect thus illustrates the second key part of
empathy, which is the ability to distinguish others from oneself. Empathy thus does not involve a
complete Self-Other merging, but allows for understanding what others are experiencing, while
distinct from oneself. A complete overlapping between self and other representation leads to
empathic overarousal or personal distress, which is a self-focused, aversive response to another’s
emotional state (Decety & Jackson, 2006). Perspective taking is therefore fundamental to social
interaction since it allows people to shift between the other and self perspectives and leads to
adaptive social behavior. Prosocial behavior such as altruism has been shown to be influenced to
a large extent by the ability of a person to empathize and take the perspective of another without
confusion with one’s own perspective (Baston et al., 1991).
Lastly, empathy involves emotion regulation and self agency. When one adopts the
perspective of another, one needs to be able to disentangle oneself from the experiences of others
in order to prevent emotional distress or anxiety, which is an aversive reaction to the emotions
felt by another. Emotion regulation thus necessitates the ability to maintain a sense of whose
feelings belong to whom and the intensity of the emotion felt. Furthermore, research has shown
that emotion regulation positively relates to feelings of concern for the other person, suggesting
that people who are able to regulate their emotions are more likely to experience empathy and act
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in morally desirable ways towards other people (Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 2004).
In this way, the ability to cope with the distress of another person, which relies on emotion
regulation capabilities, affects the experience of empathy. If a person is not able to regulate their
own emotions, they are more likely to experience emotional distress rather than empathy in
response to another’s experiences (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Likewise, one’s sense of self
agency and self-awareness is crucial for understanding and acting on one’s empathic response
towards another. Being aware of one’s own emotions and feelings enables reflection on these
emotions and whether one will choose to help the other person. Emotion reappraisal requires the
use of cognitive and emotional synthesis, as a person becomes cognizant of why they feel a
certain way and if the emotion is sufficient to elicit a behavioral response, such as in altruism
(Decety & Jackson, 2004). Thus, empathy necessitates emotional regulation and self agency so
that people are not overwhelmed by their emotions, but are able to understand their emotions and
the emotions of others, and to act positively in response to them.
Even when a person exhibits these major components of empathy, such as perspective
taking and emotion regulation, they do not always have an empathic response towards others.
Another major influence on the experience of empathy is the context of the social situation and
relationship between the two people interacting. For instance, when people are in a competitive
situation they will tend to show counterempathetic responses, so that they will experience a
positive affect when a competitor loses and negative affect when he or she wins. Even though the
person may be able to take on the perspective of the competitor and simulate the other person’s
emotions, their attitudes towards the competitor interfere with their experience of empathy
towards the other person (Lansetta & English, 1989). Interestingly, gender has also been shown
to play a role in empathic responses towards others. When a fair, liked player was in pain both
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men and women experienced empathy for that person, but when an unfair and disliked player
was in pain, men showed an increase in activation of reward-centers in the brain that correlated
with their desire for revenge. In this way, the men’s motivation for revenge overcame their
empathic concern when they believed the other person deserved to be in pain (Singer et al.,
2006). As these examples suggest, the attitudes one holds for the other person who is in
emotional or physical pain affects whether one will experience empathy towards that person.
The essential aspect of empathy is therefore the ability to recognize another person as like
oneself while maintaining a clear separation between self and other, which is accomplished by
effective perspective taking, emotional regulation and self agency. Our ability to distinguish
ourselves from others prevents emotional distress and anxiety from interfering with our capacity
to empathize and act in a prosocial way towards others. Furthermore, by mimicking other’s facial
expressions and having similar neural processing as another person through simulation, we are
able to experience the same feelings as another and understand their perspective more fully.
While social context and gender can play a role in the modulation of empathic responses,
ultimately it is our attitudes towards another person and ability to take their perspective that
affects whether we will share the same emotion as them. This affective response to another’s
emotional state therefore allows us to have a better understanding of what others are thinking,
feeling and doing. In this way, empathy facilitates more fluid social interaction due to shared
emotions and perspective taking, and can lead to positive social behavior (Singer & Lamm,
2009).
Attention Switching and Executive Functioning
Another necessary aspect of social cognition is attention switching and executive
functioning, such as cognitive control and conflict monitoring. Attention switching is important
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for social interaction, since it allows a person to be aware of one’s own goals and thoughts while
attending to another person and their mental state. By shifting attention between the self and
other, one is able to have a greater ToM and more fluid social interaction (Young, Dodell-Feder,
& Saxe, 2010). If a person were continually focused on the self, they would not be able to
understand the other person’s perspective, and if the person was only focused on the other, they
would ignore their own goals and needs, potentially to their own detriment. It is therefore
beneficial to have an executive control of attention so that people can focus on salient aspects of
the social interaction, whether it is understanding the other person’s perspective or reflecting on
their own desires and needs. The relationship between attention switching and ToM has been
shown in a study by Scholz et al. (2009), in which neighboring regions in the TPJ were
differentially activated for these cognitive processes. While the brain regions involved are
distinct for each cognitive process, it shows that the TPJ subserves both ToM and attention
switching, and suggests that increased ability in one area could benefit the other. Furthermore,
the control of attention involves the coordinated activity of both prefrontal and parietal brain
regions (Tamber-Rosenau, Esterman, Chiu & Yantis, 2011). These areas, such as the MPFC,
mediate the transition of attention from one object to another in order to achieve behavioral
goals, and are also seen to be involved in ToM. Thus, the link between attention switching and
social cognition can be made through both neuroimaging evidence and psychological reasoning.
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control are other important aspects of social cognition
that are generally only measured in executive functioning tasks. Conflict monitoring allows
people to maintain social rules and norms by monitoring their behavior in social interactions and
gauging the responses of other people to their own actions. This ability to monitor one’s own
actions according to a set of rules has been seen in paradigms such as the Stoop task. In this
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experiment, participants are required to name the color of ink of a set of words, which are
usually color names themselves. Participants must inhibit their automatic response of simply
reading the words and instead attend to the ink color and keep the rules of the experiment in
working memory. Through such as task, participants show their ability to error check and selfevaluate their own performance. These skills are also necessary in social settings, as evidenced
by continuous self-appraisals of one’s behavior to facilitate social interaction. Furthermore, the
Stroop task has been shown to elicit activation in the ACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Swick, & Jovanovic, 2002). These brain regions are also activated in social cognition such as
ToM and suggest that similar neural networks are used for both these cognitive processes.
Likewise, cognitive control is important for social cognition because it helps people to achieve
their goals in social interactions by maintaining selective attention to a particular object or
person, even in the face of other distractions. Paradigms such as a dichotic listening task utilize
this cognitive ability, as people are asked to attend to auditory stimuli from only one ear and
disregard competing auditory stimuli from the other ear. It has been found that the ACC and
medial frontal gyrus are implicated in selective attention, and that the localization in the ACC
overlapped with areas known for cognitive processing, rather than emotional processing
(Hugdahl et al., 2009). These neural networks are also seen in joint attention, which is a subset of
attentional processes that is specific to social cognition, and provide evidence for similar
processes in both social and cognitive domains. Thus cognitive control and selective attention
affect how well a person is able to attend to another person, with other internal and external
distractions present, and can influence social interaction.
All this evidence suggests that executive functioning plays a role in social cognition and
interaction. While most studies do not compare the two domains explicitly, it is possible to draw

DT 18
conclusions from these empirical findings and apply them to social cognition. With overlapping
neural networks involved in attention switching, cognitive control, conflict monitoring, ToM and
joint attention (to be discussed shortly) such as the ACC, MPFC and TPJ, it seems likely that
these executive cognitive processes are involved in social cognition and can positively influence
one’s interactions with others.
Joint Attention & Joint Action
The last major cognitive processes behind social cognition discussed here is joint
attention and joint action. To date, the majority of experiments in the fields of cognitive
psychology and cognitive neuroscience have only measured humans as they perform solitary
tasks. However, in recent years researchers have begun to explore the neural and behavioral
differences between dyadic and single humans, particularly in social paradigms involving joint
attention and joint action. Joint attention is the sharing of common perceptual ground between
two people, usually by following another’s eye gaze. This allows people to focus on the same
thing as they are having a conversation, for example, and so links the two minds to the same
visual environment. By perceiving what others perceive, we are able to better understand what
they are thinking and relate to them better. All social interaction requires the effective
deployment of joint attention even when such action is “simple” conversation and even in the
absence of pointing and other gestures . This phenomenon was illustrated in the study by
Richardson et al. (2007) in which participants were physically separate but had a two-way
conversation via headset about a visual display. Eye tracking recordings showed that participants
coupled their eye movements based on what aspect of the picture they were talking about, even
though the other person was not able to gesture or make eye contact with them. Participants also
looked at the same thing more frequently if they were given similar information about the visual
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display than if they were given different information. This study suggests that joint attention is
context dependent and occurs even when there is no visual contact between people, enabling
them to share a common ground and have a better understanding of one another.
Interestingly, joint attention has been shown to activate similar brain regions as in ToM,
such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS). This implicates that social representation occurs in
the STS, as it is more responsive to eye shifts that convey social meaning such as where people’s
interests lie (Pelphrey et al., 2003). As this social information helps us understand one another’s
intentions and state of mind better, joint attention is a necessary marker for fluid social
interaction (Frischen et al., 2007). It is not only important for social development and vocabulary
learning, but allows people to convey emotions, beliefs and desires, especially through gaze
cueing and eye contact. Furthermore, joint attention has been shown to influence the extent and
quality of social networks across the life span, which leads to greater social interaction and social
cognition (Dunbar, 2008). By having similar perceptual experiences as another person, we are
able to better understand their intentions and goals, which thus facilitate social interaction and
theory of mind.
Joint attention is also necessary for coordinating with another in joint goal directed
behavior, or joint action. Joint action is defined as any form of social interaction where two or
more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the
environment (Sebanz et al., 2006). Therefore it is not enough to simply imitate what the other
person is doing; rather, people need to understand the joint goal and the other’s actions in order
to plan and execute their own actions in relation to what they anticipate the other will do. By
having a mental representation of the other’s action, they are able to incorporate it into their own
action planning and thus coordinate their own behavior accordingly. For instance, in an fMRI

DT 20
study by Newman-Norlund et al. (2007), participants in a virtual bar lifting task were asked to
balance a ball on top of a bar where each participant lifted only one side of the bar. Each
participant had to anticipate the other’s actions in order to respond with their own actions so that
the goal could be achieved. Furthermore, participants in this joint action condition were found to
mentally simulate the actions of the other and incorporate it into representations of their own
actions through the activation of the human mirror neuron system, which has been shown to be
involved in representations of the self and others. In this way, it seems as though task sharing
and shared cooperative activities such as joint action necessitate the incorporation of others’
actions as one’s own in order to better facilitate joint goal directed behavior.
Implicit Turn Taking
Social cognition has also been seen in a number of paradigms which involve both joint
attention and joint action. In dyadic Go-NoGo experiments, each participant is required to
respond only to a certain stimulus which is the opposite of the other participant. Therefore, the
Go trial for one participant is the NoGo trial for the other participant, resulting in an implicit turn
taking task. Thus, dyadic Go-NoGo experiments involve response inhibition, turn taking, shared
perceptual ground and self-monitoring.
These studies have shown that people respond differently when with another person
compared to when they are alone. For instance, when the specific stimuli participants are to
respond to is on the same side of the screen as another participant or pointing at the other
participant, they take longer in responding because they think it is the other participant’s turn.
Known as the Simon effect, it refers to the finding that participant’s performance is slower when
the spatial relationship between stimulus and response is incongruent. Interestingly, this effect
was not seen when participants were alone because they were the only one responding to stimuli
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(Sebanz et al., 2006; Sebanz et al., 2007; Tsai et al., 2006). In this experiment, two participants
were asked to attend to visual stimuli on a computer screen and to respond to a picture of a hand
pointing either to the left or to the right. Participants sat next to each other, so it looked as if the
hand was pointing at either the participant sitting to the right or the participant sitting on the left.
The participants were assigned to respond to the color of the ring on the hand quickly as possible
by pressing a button on a response box pad that corresponded to their assigned ring color. In this
way, the Go trial for one participant was a NoGo trial for the other participant and resulted in an
implicit turn taking task. When participants responded to their colored ring when the hand
pointed at the other participant, they showed the “social Simon effect” since the stimulus was
incongruent to their spatial position. Likewise, when the hand pointed at themselves it was
considered a congruent condition, and participants responded quicker because they believed it
was their own turn. The neural mechanisms involved in single versus dyadic conditions differed
greatly in this task, especially on Go trials. Sebanz et al. (2006) and Tsai et al. (2006) both found
an increased P3 and N2 event related potentials (ERPs) during incompatible Go trials. This is
explained by the fact that the participants were both anticipating the other’s actions and planning
their own response, whereas in a single condition the participant would not be anticipating
another’s actions. Since similar neural mechanisms are involved in monitoring one’s own and
others’ task performance, another’s actions are represented in a functionally equivalent way to
one’s own. These neural signals were seen to be localized in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during Go trials and in the inferior and superior
parietal lobe and the supplementary motor cortex during NoGo trials (Sebanz et al., 2007).
Interestingly, simply thinking that another unseen participant is responding in the Go-NoGo
experiment is enough to activate mental representations of the other, even when the other
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participant is in reality the computer responding at random intervals (Tsai et al., 2008). This
action co-representation is thus activated by believing another person is acting in conjunction
with oneself regardless of their physical presence. In a separate condition where participants
believed they were co-acting with the computer’s responses, such neural markers for action
representation were not seen, suggesting that it is the real or imagined presence of a biological
agent that cause these representational activation patterns.
Social Coordination and Co-representation
Other studies of dyadic social interaction involve spontaneous synchronization and
unconscious mimicry. In a simple finger tapping task, participants were seen to coordinate their
speed of finger movement upon visual information exchange with the other participant (Oullier
et al., 2008). Participants also retained a social memory for the interaction, so that they did not
return to their own preferred finger tapping speed after visual contact was cut off, but rather
tapped slightly quicker if they had been slow originally or tapped much slower if they had been
quick originally. This experiment therefore shows how an individual’s behavior is modified
through interactions with others such that they do not return to their original behavior after a
social interaction. Likewise, Tognoli et al. (2007) found that people in this paradigm were more
likely to show specific neural markers for coordinated behavior versus individual behavior.
When participants tapped according to their own preferred rhythm, a specific EEG rhythm, the
phi1 complex, was seen in the right centro-parietal cortex, while the phi2 complex was seen
during coordinated behavior. One possible explanation for these findings is that the phi1 complex
reflects the inhibition of the mirror neuron system and unconscious mimicry, whereas the phi2
complex represents its enhancement. This suggests that there are different neuromarkers for
social interaction and coordination, similar to those previously shown to be involved in joint
action and the Go-NoGo tasks (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; Sebanz et al., 2007).
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Current Research
Now that some of the main cognitive processes which are involved in understanding
others have been set forth, along with neuroscientific data about social neural networks and
cognitive aging, it is possible to postulate the psychological and neural underpinnings of social
cognition in older adults, which may be beneficial to well-being and successful aging. We
hypothesize that the neural and behavioral measures of other-regard in the laboratory would
correspond to real world indices of social cognition, such as social network quality and extent
and empathic concern. We further hypothesize that cognitive processes such as ToM, empathy
and joint attention are involved in social cognition in the laboratory, and that brain regions
associated with these cognitive processes would be differentially activated during other-regard.
This experiment investigated other-regard in a dyadic and individual Go-NoGo paradigm
(Sebanz et al., 2006) in which participants were required to respond to the color of a ring on a
picture of a hand so that the Go trial for one participant was the No-Go trial for the other. The
index finger of the hand pointed either to the participant (congruent condition), to the other
participant (incongruent condition), or directly ahead (neutral condition). However, the finger
and hand were task-irrelevant. Participants who nonetheless attended to the hand, and therefore
modified behavior according to whom it pointed at, were expected to show slower Go responses
to their assigned ring color when the hand pointed to the other participant, since they thought it
was the other participant’s turn. Other-regard was behaviorally operationalized as a difference in
reaction times (RTs) between trials when the hand pointed to self (congruent condition) and
when the hand pointed to the other (incongruent condition). This difference in RTs was expected
to be significantly greater than zero, whereby the congruent RT was subtracted from the longer
incongruent RT. Likewise, RTs in the dyadic condition were expected to be longer than in the
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individual condition since the presence of another person would activate neural representations
of the other which would then influence their cognitive processing. This would therefore result in
a longer RT on trials where the hand pointed to the other person.
Using the Lubben Social Network Scale (Lubben et al., 1996) and the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index, which assesses self-report empathy (Davis, 1983), we predict that those who
scored higher on these quantitative measures would also show these social markers in longer RTs
and neural connections. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index has four subscales which measure
perspective taking, empathic concern, personal distress and fantasization. Perspective taking and
empathic concern positively contribute to the experience of empathy, while personal distress and
fantasization negatively affect the experience of empathy. Personal distress is the amount of selfdistress one feels in response to another person’s distress and fantasization is how much one
fantasizes or day dreams about what it would be like to be another person. We would expect that
people with higher perspective taking and empathic concern would have more other-regard,
while those who have more personal distress and fantasize more would exhibit less other-regard.
Thus empathy, as a subset of ToM, is a necessary part of social cognition and it makes sense that
people who are more empathic would have greater other-regard and perspective taking, and viceversa. Likewise, people who show increased social cognition in the laboratory by their increased
RTs in the incongruent condition would be expected to have more social interaction outside of
the laboratory, as evidenced by their social network extent.
Since most of the research conducted thus far has only used EEG recording units with
less than 64 electrodes, they have been unable to do source localization due to being under
spatial Nyquist (Srinivasan et al., 1996). This project uses two dense array, 256-channel
electroencephalographic (dEEG) recording units in a state-of-the-art linked configuration to
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record participants’ cortical activation simultaneously, which should not only help with source
localization, but enable researchers to determine how participants interact with each other in real
time on a neural basis. This would help ascertain which brain regions are involved in social
cognition in older adults and whether these neural networks are different from those found in
younger adults, due to potential changes in brain structure from aging. Although our neural
findings are not reported here due to technological complications with the analyses, we set forth
our expectations for neural processes involved in other-regard. Based on previous research, older
adults are expected to show an increase in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, temporal-parietal
junction and superior temporal sulcus processing during other-regard, as these regions are
implicated in ToM and joint attention. Furthermore, the ACC has been shown to be involved in
attentional shifting and joint attention, and would be expected to increase in the incongruent
condition since the person would switch their attention from self to other when the hand was
pointing at the other person. These activations are further expected to occur in the later epochs,
such as 300-450 ms post-stimulus, as these cognitive processes recruit a wide-range of brain
areas and occur after basic sensory perception such as visual processing of the stimuli (Sebanz et
al., 2006; Sebanz et al, 2007).
In the earlier epochs, such as P1 or 100 ms post-stimulus, it is expected that there will be
a decrease in neural signals localized in the occipital cortex when the hand is pointing at the
other person. This lack of visual response to the incongruent condition is due to the fact that the
person expects it to be the other participant’s turn and so does not need to attend to the hand that
is not pointing at themselves. However, if they did not take into account the direction of the
pointing finger, then they would be expected to show an equal response to both congruent and
incongruent stimuli, since they would only be responding to the color of the ring. Such
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participants would not be expected to show other-regard in the form of the longer RT in the
incongruent condition. Likewise, participants who exhibit other-regard are expected to show an
increase in the motor cortex, more specifically in M1 and the premotor areas, during the
incongruent trials. This effect would be seen around or after 300 ms post-stimulus, which is
when most participants are expected to respond to the stimulus with a button press. However,
their neural signals should be greater than when in the congruent condition because they would
be mentally representing the other participant’s response as their own, since they expected the
other participant to respond, and then overrode this representation with their own motor
response. In this way, the effects of other regard can be seen even in the simple perceptual
processes such as vision and motor movement.
Lastly, it is hypothesized that the neural signals would positively correlate with
participant’s behavioral responses. Therefore, people who showed more other-regard by taking
longer to respond in the incongruent condition would be expected to have greater activation in
brain regions associated with other-regard and social cognition. Likewise, it is expected that
participants’ neural activation would correlate with their social network extent. This real world
index of social cognition would be beneficial to showing how the findings of this empirical
research would mirror real life social interaction and quality. In this way, the differential
activation of certain neural networks can be compared to social cognition outside of the
laboratory, and implicated in the cognitive well-being in older adults. Through these
comparisons it is posited that efficient neural networks can be found which correlate with better
social cognition, as evidenced by participants’ other-regard in RT differences, empathy subscales
and social network quality and extent.
Methods
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Participants
In this study, 43 older adults from the Claremont and Upland communities were recruited
via Craigslist and personal reference, ranging from ages 54 to 89 (M = 67.8, SD = 10.0). 16 men
and 27 women participated. Out of the dyad groupings, 21 people were strangers to their partner
and 22 people knew their partner (4 were friends and 18 were married or dating). The 14
participants who showed the expected behavioral effect consisted of 9 women and 5 men, with
ages ranging from 59 to 86 (M = 67.1, SD = 8.8). Participants from various racial/ethnic,
academic, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds were equally represented.
Materials
Participants were given informed consent prior to starting the experiment and debriefed
upon completing the experiment. Participants’ real world social behavior such as empathy and
the extent and quality of social networks were assessed using self-report measures (Davis, 1983;
Lubben et al., 2006; See Appendixes A and B). Visual stimuli were presented using EPrime
software (Psychological Software Tools, 2002; See Appendix C) and EEG data recorded in
NetStation. Behavioral and neural analyses were done using Matlab and SPM8.
Procedure
In this experiment, participants were asked to attend to visual stimuli on a computer
screen (See Figure 1). After a 500ms fixation cross, they were asked to respond to a picture of a
hand pointing either straight ahead, to the left or to the right. On the hand was a grey ring, which
after 500 ms changed colors to either red or green. The participant sitting to the left of the
computer screen responded to a red ring and the participant sitting to the right responded to a
green ring. They were asked to respond as quickly as possible by pressing a button on a response
box pad that corresponded to their specific ring color (1 for a red ring or 4 for a green ring). The
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experiment consisted of 5 blocks of 102 trials each (510 trials total), which were done in the
dyadic condition and the individual condition. In the individual condition, participants responded
to the same color ring as in the dyadic condition and ignored the other ring color when it was
presented. Participants responded using only their dominant hand. Participants’ neuronal cortical
activity was measured during the experiment using simultaneous recordings of two dense-array,
256-channel electroencephalographic (dEEG) recording units that were temporally linked. This
provided millisecond accurate recordings of event related potentials (ERPs) to show the activity
of the two brains in dyadic interaction.
[Place Figure 1 About Here]
Data Analysis
For the behavioral results, a linear regression was used to determine the correlation
strength between social network size and other-regard, and between empathic concern and otherregard in the implicit turn taking task. R2 values were calculated on these independent variables
using standard statistical procedures. T-tests were also conducted on the group and individual
reaction times to see if the two conditions (hand pointing at other and hand pointing at self) were
significantly different from each other.
Results
Other-regard was behaviorally operationalized as a difference in reaction times (RTs)
between trials when the hand pointed to self and when the hand pointed to the other (Other-Self,
or Incongruent-Congruent).
Self-Report
For the Lubben Social Network Scale, it was found that males had a significantly smaller
social network than females (Mean Male = 14.9, SD = 5.2; Mean Female = 18.4, SD = 5.6;
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t(1,40) = -2.019, p = 0.025, one-tailed; See Figure 2). There was no significant effect found for
age and social network extent (r = 0.214, p = 0.174, R2 = 0.034, beta = 1.392).
[Place Figure 2 About Here]
For the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, empathic concern was marginally less in men than
in women (Mean Male = 49.1, SD = 7.3; Mean Female = 52.9, SD = 9.9; t(1,41) = -1.330, p =
0.096, one-tailed; See Figure 3). Age did not have any significant effect on empathic concern (r
= -0.086, p = 0.584, R2 = -1.602, beta = 1.273). For fantasization scores, neither gender nor age
played a role in the scores (Mean Male = 37.8, SD = 11.6; Mean Female = 42.5, SD = 10.7;
t(1,41) = -1.339, p = 0.187, two-tailed; r = -0.281, p = 0.068, R2 = -4.165, beta = 1.532). Personal
distress did have a significant negative correlation with age (r = -0.334, p = 0.029, R2 = -6.802,
beta = 2.028; see Figure 4), but not with gender (Mean Male = 27.7, SD = 8.1; Mean Female =
30.0, SD = 11.8; t(1,41) = -0.727, p = 0.236, one-tailed). Age did not have any effect on
perspective taking (r = 0.237, p = 0.124, R2 = -1.557, beta = 1.404), nor did gender (Mean Male
= 44.6, SD = 11.0; Mean Female = 47.2, SD = 10.3; t(1,41) = -0.801, p = 0.428, two-tailed).
[Place Figures 3 and 4 About Here]
Behavioral
Three analyses serve as the foci of the results from the behavioral data. First, the
expected RT difference at the group level was tested, given that this study was the first to apply
this paradigm in older adults. It was found that 14 out of the 43 participants showed a statistically
significant difference in RTs in the expected direction. There was an overall group effect
(N=43), such that the group was slower in responding on Go trials when the finger pointed to the
other participant (Mean Difference = 15.0 ms, SD = 22.5 ms; t(1,42) = 4.312, p < 0.001; See
Figure 5). This difference was even greater in the 14 participants whose RT differences were
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significantly greater than zero (Mean Difference = 24.5 ms, SD = 25.2 ms; t(1,13) = 4.564, p <
.001; See Figure 6). There was no association found between RT difference scores and age (r =
0.102, p = 0.514, R2 = -0.034, beta = 1.406, See Figure 7). However, when comparing age to the
separate conditions, there was a positive correlation between age and congruent RTs (r = 0.519, p
< 0.001, R2 = 0.010, beta = 0.172, See Figure 8) and between age and incongruent RTs (r =
0.516, p < 0.001, R2 = -0.045, beta = 0.167, See Figure 9). There was no significant difference in
RT difference between the genders (Mean Male = 13.8 ms, SD = 26.7 ms; Mean Female = 12.3
ms, SD = 19.1 ms; t(1,41) = 0.211, p = 0.833, two-tailed), nor when gender was compared to
congruent RTs (Mean Male = 403.2 ms, SD = 66.9 ms; Mean Female = 380.2 ms, SD = 54.0 ms;
t(1,41) = 1.234, p = 0.224, two-tailed) or incongruent RTs (Mean Male = 417.0 ms, SD = 71.6
ms; Mean Female = 392.3 ms, SD = 58.7 ms; t(1,41) = 1.231, p = 0.225, two-tailed).
[Place Figures 5-9 About Here]
Second, participants’ individual RT differences were tested to whether there was a
correlation with their social network and empathy scores. On empathy, only Personal Distress at
another person’s distress was found to decrease with increased RT difference, and therefore
decreased with increased other-regard (r = -0.36, p = 0.01, R2 = -6.464, beta = 0.47; See Figure
10). No significant correlation was found for empathic concern, perspective taking or
fantasization (r = -0.107, p = 0.495, R2 = -24.5, beta = 1.010; r = -0.241, p = 0.120, R2 = -15.6,
beta = 0.852; r = -0.078, p = 0.617, R2 = -10.4, beta = 0.795). Finally, there was a marginal effect
suggesting an association between increased RT difference and better quality and extent of social
networks (r = 0.20, p = 0.11, R2 = -6.216, beta = 0.39; See Figure 11).
[Place Figures 10 and 11 About Here]
Neural
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Due to unforeseen technical difficulties and potential data artifacts, analyses of neural
metrics are still ongoing, but the behavioral associations found thus far are promising for the
identification of neural signals that associate with both other-regard and real-world social
network extent and quality, and for the localization of those signals. For the future neural
analyses, only the 14 participants who showed the statistically significant behavioral RT
difference will be considered. It is unclear what cognitive processes the other participants were
engaging in, as they did not show other-regard to the same extent, and so analyzing their neural
data would be inconclusive.
Discussion
To date, the majority of prior research on social cognition and the cognitive processes
that underlie social interaction has not focused on older adults. With recent evidence suggesting
that social network extent and a mentally active lifestyle can prevent cognitive decline and
decrease the risk of age-related neurological diseases such as dementia and Alzheimer’s, it is
important to investigate social cognition in older adults and how it benefits well-being and
cognitive outcomes later in life (Cohen & Willis, 1985; Zunzunegui et al., 2003; Hertzog et al.,
2009). There are many different cognitive processes that are required to have effective social
interaction, such as theory of mind (ToM), empathy, joint attention and executive functioning.
This study sought to understand the cognitive processes involved in social cognition through
behavioral and neural indices of other-regard. Based on a “social Simon task” that Sebanz et al.
(2006) used with younger adults, older participants were expected to demonstrate social
cognition and other-regard by longer reaction times to stimuli that implicitly referred to the other
participant. Although the neural analyses are still forthcoming, the behavioral and self-report
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results from this implicit turn-taking task shed light on social cognition in older adults and some
of the effects of social cognition outside the laboratory.
Our results showed that older adults do show the Simon effect in an implicit turn-taking
task, whereby they take longer to respond to stimuli that refer to the other participant. This otherregard was operationalized as the difference between reaction times to congruent (hand pointing
to self) and incongruent stimuli (hand pointing to other person). Across the group, participants
were seen to show this effect even if it was not statistically significant on an individual level. 14
participants did have a statistically significant reaction time difference, suggesting that they had
more efficient social cognition processes and neural networks. Importantly, there was no
relationship between age and reaction time difference, since otherwise the paradigm would not
have accurately measured cognitive other-regard but rather motor reflex times. As can be seen by
the correlations between age and the raw scores (congruent RTs and incongruent RTs), there is
an effect due to age which is to be expected, since people move more slowly as they get older.
However, this motor effect is negated by subtracting the two conditions within subjects, so that
participants’ slowed RTs due to other-regard and cognitive processing is able to be measured.
Our next hypothesis was that other-regard measured in the laboratory would correlate
with social network extent in the real world. This was shown to be true, as participants who had
greater reaction time differences between the two stimuli conditions tended to have a larger
social network than people who did not show this behavioral effect. Although this correlation
was not statistically significant (p = 0.11), it was trending in the positive direction. This suggests
that the paradigm accurately measured social cognition and that participants who have more
social interaction on a regular basis will have better social cognition, and vice versa.
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Our last hypothesis was that other-regard reaction time differences would correlate with
empathy. Of the four subscales on the empathy self-report measure (empathic concern,
perspective taking, personal distress and fantasization), only personal distress correlated with
other-regard. Personal distress is the amount of self-distress one feels in response to another
person’s distress and is related to one’s ability to regulate emotion. Previous research has shown
that emotion regulation is positively related to feelings of concern for the other person
(Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Eisenberg et al., 1994). However, people who experience their
emotions intensely, especially negative emotions, are likely to experience personal distress,
which is an aversive emotional reaction, such as anxiety or discomfort based on the recognition
of another’s emotional state or condition (Davis, 1983; Eisenberg et al., 1991). Interestingly,
people prone to personal distress may present deficits in self-other distinctiveness as they are not
able to differentiate between their own pain and the pain another person feels (Decety & Jackson,
2006). This is supported by our study, since participants who had higher scores on personal
distress showed decreased other-regard, suggesting a confusion or lack of distinction between
self and other. Furthermore, heightened personal distress can lead to an egoistic motivation to
reduce that distress by withdrawal or another aversive response. This would lead to a decrease in
other-regard in social interaction since people would be focusing on their own emotional distress
and not the other person (Singer & Lamm, 2009). This is also implicated by the results in our
study and suggests that people who focus on themselves exclusively or are unable to differentiate
between self and other will be less empathic, have more personal distress and be less likely to
have other-regard in social situations.
Interestingly, age was seen to negatively correlate with personal distress, so that as
people become older they are less likely to feel distress at another person’s distress. While
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correlation does not equal causation, this suggests that as people age they are less likely to
respond negatively to other’s emotional states and so have better social cognition. While it is true
that older people could simply not care about other people’s distress, it seems unlikely that this
would be the case. As personal distress prevents the experience of empathy, it could be posited
that older people would be more likely to empathize with others. However, as the empathic
concern scale did not correlate with age, it is still unclear exactly what the relationship between
empathy and age may be.
There were also some interesting relationships found between gender and self-report
measures of social cognition. Empathic concern was seen to be significantly less in men than in
women, which supports the existing body of research on this subject (Toussaint & Webb, 2005).
One interesting study by Alwall & Hansen (2010) showed that women were better than men at
gaze-cueing and joint attention, which are contributors to social cognition and empathy. Social
network was also seen to be significantly less in men than women, which has been implicated in
previous studies (Baron-Cohn, 2003). This is consistent with the idea that women are more
sociable than men, and more empathetic. Interestingly, a study by Krach et al. (2009) suggested
that women had greater ToM through activation of the medial prefrontal cortex when they
believed they were playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with another person. If women are
better at mentalizing and representing the psychological states of other people, then it would
follow that they would have more social contacts and social cognition.
These findings demonstrate that older adults take into account the presence of another
person during an implicit turn-taking task, thus replicating the findings from Sebanz et al.
(2006). This other-regard was shown behaviorally in the laboratory and also correlates with
indices of real-life social cognition, such as social network extent. While there was no
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relationship between empathy (empathic concern) and other-regard, personal distress had a
negative correlation with other-regard. This means that participants who reported more distress
were less likely to show other-regard and have less efficient social cognition. Interestingly, this
supports the current research on social network extent being a predictor of psychological wellbeing in aging (Gow et al., 2007). Since people who have more friends presumably have better
social cognition due to mental stimulation from interacting with people on a regular basis, they
would have less personal distress in their lives which would lead to well-being. Furthermore, the
fact that other-regard correlated with social network extent shows that our results are measuring
real-world effects and can be applied to more than just the laboratory setting. Thus, this study
illustrates how social cognition in older adults is measurable in the laboratory and how it applies
to real-life indices of social interaction and cognition.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Unfortunately, the neural data for this project was not able to be presented due to time
constraints on technical analysis and unforeseen complications with the software programming.
However, once these obstacles are overcome, we expect that our previous hypotheses would
stand. Namely, that older adults who show statistically significant other-regard would have
differential activation in the TPJ, vmPFC, ACC and STS in the incongruent condition at 300 –
450 ms post-stimulus, since these areas are implicated in ToM, empathy, executive control of
attention, and joint attention, all of which are necessary aspects of social cognition (Mason &
Macrae, 2008; Swick, & Jovanovic, 2002; Sebanz et al., 2007). Furthermore, participants should
have decreased activation in the occipital cortex at 100 ms post-stimulus in the incongruent
condition, as they would take into consideration the image of the hand and not attend to it as
much as in the congruent condition. Participants are also expected to show increased motor
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cortex activity at 300ms post-stimulus in the incongruent condition as the participant both
anticipates the other participant’s response and then responds themselves after 300 ms. This
suggests both early and late neural processing that leads to behavioral other-regard. We expect
that the neural signals would correlate with participant RT differences, as well as their social
network extend and empathy self-report scores. Thus, continued research needs to be done to
ascertain which neural networks are utilized in other-regard in older adults and whether these
differ from earlier in life.
Another possible area in future research would be to investigate social cognition in older
adults, but in different age ranges. For instance, different age groups such as 55-65 years old, 6575, and 75 and older could potentially have very different neural and cognitive processing from
each other. It would be beneficial to track the changes in social cognition, since a 55 year old
physically active woman would have very different mental functioning than a home-bound 95
year old man. To categorize all people over a certain age range as the same seems to be an overgeneralization, and it could be that researchers are missing out on important information
regarding social-cognitive development. As can be seen by the correlation between age and
personal distress found in this study, it would be interesting to discover why older people are less
likely to feel personal distress. If they are better at regulating their emotions or distinguishing the
self from others, it could benefit younger adults to understand what causes this so that they can
have better social interactions and cognition as well. In this way, studying older adults leads to
greater understanding of social aging and implications for people of all ages. By increasing our
knowledge about changes in cognitive functioning and neural networks over time, as well as
what can be done to mitigate cognitive decline, it will be possible to improve the well-being of
older adults and enhance our social cognitive abilities.
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Figures

Figure 1. Individual and paired conditions. Pictures of a hand pointing to the left, to the middle
or to the right with a colored ring on the index finger are shown. In the example illustrated here,
the left person is instructed to respond to red (dashed lines) and the right person is instructed to
respond to green (solid lines). Stimuli that point away from the person are considered
incongruent, while stimuli that point to the person are congruent. Stimuli that point straight
ahead are neutral and used as a control. Diagram on left adapted from Sebanz et al. (2006);
images on right created by researcher for this experiment.
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Figure 2. Comparison of gender and social network size, based on the Lubben Social Network
scale (LSN). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean t(1,40) = -2.019, p = 0.025, onetailed.
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Figure 3. Comparison of gender and empathic concern, based on the IRI. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean t(1,41) = -1.330, p = 0.096, one-tailed.

DT 40

Figure 4. Comparison of age and personal distress, based on the IRI. r = -0.334, p = 0.029, R2 =
-6.802, beta = 2.028
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Figure 5. Comparison of group RTs in msec on Go trials to the stimulus condition. Congruent
stimuli are pictures of the hand pointing to the self, and incongruent stimuli are pictures of the
hand pointing to the other participant. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. t(1,42)
= 4.312, p < 0.001, two-tailed.
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Figure 6. Comparison of statistically significant RTs on Go trials to the condition of the stimuli.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. t(1,13) = 4.564, p < .001, two-tailed.
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Figure 7. Comparison of Age of participant to RT difference. r = 0.102, p = 0.514, R2 = -0.034,
beta = 1.406.
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Figure 8. Comparison of Age to Congruent RTs. r = 0.519, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.010, beta = 0.172.

Figure 9. Comparison of Age to Incongruent RTs. r = 0.516, p < 0.001, R2 = -0.045, beta =
0.167.
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Figure 10. Correlation between differences in RTs and Personal Distress, based on the IRI.
r = -0.36, p = 0.01, R2 = -6.464, beta = 0.47.

Figure 11. Correlation of differences in RT to social network size, based on the Lubben Social
Network scale (LSN). r = 0.20, p = 0.11, R2 = -6.216, beta = 0.39.
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Appendix A
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Rate the following statements as best you can according to how well they describe you:
Does not
describe me well
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Describes me
very well
10

____ 1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.
____ 2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
____ 3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.
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____ 4. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
____ 5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
____ 6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
____ 7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don’t often get completely
caught up in it.
____ 8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
____ 9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
____ 10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.
____ 11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective.
____ 12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
____ 13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
____ 14. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
____ 15. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments.
____ 16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
____ 17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
____ 18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for
them.
____ 19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.
____ 20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
____ 21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
____ 22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
____ 23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading
character.
____ 24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
____ 25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while.
____ 26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
events in the story were happening to me.
____ 27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
____ 28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Appendx B
LUBBEN SOCIAL NETWORK SCALE—6-Item Version
FAMILY: Considering the people to whom you are related either by birth or marriage
1. How many relatives do you see or hear from at least once a month?
0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

2. How many relatives do you feel close to such that you could call on them for help?
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0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

3. How many relatives do you feel at ease with that you can talk about private matters?
0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

FRIENDSHIPS: Considering all of your friends including those who live in your neighborhood.
4. How many of your friends do you see or hear from at least once a month?
0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

5. How many friends do you feel close to such that you could call on them for help?
0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

6. How many friends do you feel at ease with that you can talk about private matters?
0 = none 1 = one 2 = two

3 = three or four

4 = five thru eight 5 = nine or more

Appendix C
EPrime Experimental Design
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